Is ‘cancel culture’ a form of free speech too? - James Forsdyke

John Stuart Mill’s ‘On Liberty’, published in 1859, forged a pathway for the development of what we now regard as classical liberalism. Much of his work contains similar thinking to that of many modern liberals who stand against ‘cancel culture’, when individuals lose their livelihoods and experience disproportionate social exclusion for their expression - from deeply held opinions to casual musings. Some claim that the reasoning behind this anti-cancellation sentiment is confused, contradictory, paradoxical maybe, but is this true? 

Mill’s classic book, unsurprisingly and rather poetically provides many of the foundations of liberal, ‘live-and-let-live’ philosophy, “neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it.” As part of this, Mill states that it is right that individuals may choose who they associate themselves with, and further may warn others of the dangers in associating with someone. We may choose to exercise “a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against” people we may consider negative influences and “to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours.” Following this logic, we may say that there is nothing wrong with cancel culture, in that we may legitimately all decide not to conduct business with, form ties with, or to criticise certain individuals or parties. 

However, Mill states that “protection” is warranted “against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose” strict “rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.” He explicitly states that “a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence” is essential in avoiding “despotism”. In other words, individuals may choose to associate as they please, but that society as a whole shouldn’t make an outcast of a particular individual. Couldn’t the former lead to the latter? How then are these two views compatible? It is my understanding that they are, and I shall endeavour to explain why. 

Firstly, Mill believed that speech which incited physical harm or which is intended to engender undue damage to the real world circumstances of a party (mostly centred around misrepresentation and reputation) falls outside of the bounds of free speech. As such, we may say that ‘incitement to violence’ and ‘libel’ are examples of what Mill believes crosses the bounds into non-protected speech. 

If we take this depiction of what free speech involves (and what isn’t protected by it), we can relate it to modern cancel culture. Telling the truth about a person, leading to their declining public perception may not therefore be considered unjust, whereas when this becomes defamation, we may say that Mill’s ‘libel’ side-constraint dictates that this becomes so. Many misinterpret people’s stances based on inaccurate, second hand information, or do so preferring to read ‘between’ the lines, rather than the content of what has been said. Having said this, when the discrimination is real, when individual’s attitudes tend towards a perception of inferiority based upon immutable characteristics, we should tackle it head on. This goes without saying. 

Mill’s argument then covers these sorts of smear campaigns effectively. Far from a paradox, I believe that he has his bases covered. 

Some may use another aspect of On Liberty to criticise cancellation. Mill has a rather vague expression relating to consequences of one’s speech. In his words, “the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves” may be considered fair, not cancel culture. If one is rude at parties, expect to receive fewer invitations. I say that this is vague because we may each have different understandings related to what should be considered proportional consequences to the speech. What is clear however, is that at a certain level, the consequences that many have faced for potentially innocuous speech in recent times have been disproportionate. One can clearly understand what Mill was trying to do here, but it isn’t very helpful to us. We cannot use this like we could the libel case, because it doesn’t explain why it is wrong for the majority to disassociate from someone, but right that an individual may choose to do so. With the ability to access information immediately via the internet, how can we measure what constitutes an immediate or spontaneous consequence? 

So far then, we might say that Mill’s philosophy is at least able to consistently disavow the false and malicious accusations which ensue in cases of cancel culture, via his endorsement of the libel condition, but scrutiny reveals some aspects that are heavily reliant on a certain sort of interpretation, which can be contested. Finally though, a key, and little discussed train of thought involves the individual decision making process of associating (or not) with a person. Some may keep quiet about this angle, believing it to be a weak argument, but I contend that it is extremely important. Mill says that we have a right to choose who we associate with, but ‘a right’ isn’t the same as being ‘right’. My argument is that sometimes we cut ties too early, before we read somebody’s book, listen to their argument, or consider the facts. It isn’t often ‘right’ in its moral sense, to reject a person we don’t understand. This sort of cancellation can happen irrespective of where one is positioned on the political spectrum, I’ve seen it perpetrated by the right as well as the left, and it comes down to lack of willingness to give people second chances. Can we rely on a moral argument such as this? I think that it is at least worth saying. Even in cases that don’t fall into the ‘libel’ category, we might consider this: as a society, we are losing the art of giving a second chance. I think that Mill would agree with me in this analysis, with him clearly considering it right that people make their own decisions, even if they are, in some cases, morally wrong. People may, out of fear or ignorance, publicly shame or abandon ties with others. They may do so as their right, but if we want to progress as a society, we must take moral responsibility and actively engage in attempts to understand each other, learn from each other, and from history. 

Over the past year of university study, I have come to understand many different viewpoints, and am privileged to have made friends from all over the world, North, South, East and West, and from the political right, left and centre. We can learn a lot from John Stuart Mill, no matter where we come from.